Statistical analysis and simulation study of video teleconference traffic in ATM networks ', IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol., 1992, 3 SEN, P., MAGLARIS, B., RIKLI, N., and ANASTASSIOU, D.: 'Models for packet switching of variable-bit-rate video sources', ZEEE J. Introduction: At this time, there are two popular public-key algorithms which can provide digital signatures: the RSA scheme [l], in which the difficulty of breaking the scheme is based on solving the factoring of a large integer into two large prime factors, and the ElGamal signature scheme [2] ; in which the difficulty of breaking the scheme is based on solving the discrete logarithm problem. In 1991, the US govement proposed the digital signature standard (DSS) as a federal standard to enable federal government agencies to use the digital signature algorithm (DSA) [3] to sign electronic documents. The DSS is an ElGamal-type signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem. Verifying each ElGamal-type signature requires at least two modular exponentiations. Since modular exponentiation with a very large modulus is a very time-consuming computation, it is desirable to use special purpose hardware or an eficient software algorithm to speed up the signature verification process. Naccache et al. [4] proposed an interactive DSA batch verification protocol, in which the signer generates t signatures through interactions with the verifier, and then the verifer validates these t signatures at once based on one batch verification criterion. Lim and Lee [5] pointed out that the interactive DSA batch protocol proposed by Naccache et al. is insecure. Later, Ham [6] proposed a DSA-type secure interactive batch verification protocol.
The digital signature standard proposed by the US government in 1991 is an ElGamal-type signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem. Since verifying each ElGamal-type signature requires at least two modular exponentiations, and modular exponentiation is a computationally intensive operation, it becomes desirable to use special purpose hardware or an efficient software algorithm to speed up the signature verification process. The author proposes efficient and secure algorithms to verify multiple digital signatures based on the discrete logarithm. Instead of verifying each individual signature separately, it is proposed to verify multiple signatures simultaneously. The proposed batch verification algorithm can maintain a constant venfication time as to verify a single signature.
Introduction: At this time, there are two popular public-key algorithms which can provide digital signatures: the RSA scheme [l] , in which the difficulty of breaking the scheme is based on solving the factoring of a large integer into two large prime factors, and the ElGamal signature scheme [2] ; in which the difficulty of breaking the scheme is based on solving the discrete logarithm problem.
In 1991, the US govement proposed the digital signature standard (DSS) as a federal standard to enable federal government agencies to use the digital signature algorithm (DSA) [3] to sign electronic documents. The DSS is an ElGamal-type signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem. Verifying each ElGamal-type signature requires at least two modular exponentiations. Since modular exponentiation with a very large modulus is a very time-consuming computation, it is desirable to use special purpose hardware or an eficient software algorithm to speed up the signature verification process. Naccache et al. [4] proposed an interactive DSA batch verification protocol, in which the signer generates t signatures through interactions with the verifier, and then the verifer validates these t signatures at once based on one batch verification criterion. Lim and Lee [5] pointed out that the interactive DSA batch protocol proposed by Naccache et al. is insecure. Later, Ham [6] proposed a DSA-type secure interactive batch verification protocol.
In this Letter, we propose efficient and secure non-interactive algorithms to verify multiple DSA-type digital signatures signed by a private key. Instead of verifying each individual signature separately, we propose to verify multiple signatures simultaneously. Since this approach maintains the same computational load as for Verification of a single signature, a significant reduction in time for signature venfication can be acheved. The application of our algorithm can be found in some traffic congested gateways that require verification of X. 509 public-key certificates signed by the same certificate authority (CA).
Digital signature algorithm (DSA):
The DSA is a signature scheme based on the ElGamal[2] and Schnorr's signature schemes [7] . The DSA parameters are composed by public information p , q, g, a public key y and a secret key x, where (i) p is a large prime integer of length between 512 and 1024 bits (ii) q is a 160 bit prime divisor ofp -1 (iii) g is an element of order q in GF @) (iv) x is the secret key of the signer in GF (q) (v) y = gx mod p is the public key of the signer.
For each message m to be signed, a new random integer k from [l, q-1] is privately selected and then r is computed as r = (g" mod p ) mod q. Instead of signing the message m directly, all ElGamaltype signature schemes should sign the one-way hash result of m. For simplicity, we will ignore the one-way hash function in the following discussion. The DSA signature of m is the pair { r , s), where s = k l ( m + xr) mod q, and kk' mod q = 1. A signature { r, s) of a message m can be publicly verified by checking that r = (p'y' mod p ) mod q, where s' = r1 mod 4.
Naccache et al. batch verification algorithm:
We will use the following example to illustrate the Naccache et al. batch verification algorithm. Assume that there are three messages ml, m, and m3 needing to be signed by the signer. The signer interacts with the verifier and generates three individual signatures { r l , q}, {r2, s,},  {r3, s3} of messages m,, m, and m3, respectively, based on We claim that the verifier can verify these t signatures simultaneously by checking this batch verification criterion. If both sides of the equation are identical, the t signatures {Y,, s,}, {r2, s2}, ..., {rt, sJ of messages m,, m,, ..., m,, can be verified. However, if the identity does not hold, where this may result from either transmission noise or invalid individual signatures, we need to verify each individual signature separately. It is obvious that to verify these t signatures according to the batch verification criterion requires 2 modular exponentiations. However, if the verifier verifies each individual signature separately, it requires 21 modular exponentiations.
Security and discussion: We would like to point out that Lim and Lee's attack does not work properly in this proposed algorithm. In their attack, the attacker can randomly select all r, first. Then the attacker can solve s, accordingly. However, in our proposed algorithm, r, cannot be randomly selected in the first place. Conversely, the signature algorithm used to sign each individual signature is also secure. In fact, the following EIGamal-type signature algorithms as listed in [8] can also be used to develop similar batch verification criteria. signature eauation We claim that these two variants are the most efficient DSA variants since they are as secure as the DSA, they do not require computation of any modular inverse on the signer and the verifier, and they can support batch verifying multiple signatures. 
